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President Obama has been supporting a new bill, the Employee Free Choice Act, designed to 
promote the labor unions’ drive for unionization.  This bill, if enacted, will surely be a big boon 
for unions as it helps enlarge their membership, enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
businesses, and enrich their coffers to wield political clout. An important issue here, however, is 
how such reinforced unionism contributes to the U.S.’s much needed industrial competitiveness 
and employment—and, more specifically, how this new policy will affect the U.S. as a host to 
FDI in the auto industry.  
 
In 2008, GM yielded its world’s top position to Toyota.  Unfortunately, Detroit’s woes have been 
caused in significant part by the ever-restrictive work rules and legacy costs (i.e., generous 
wages and retirement and healthcare benefits) obtained by the United Auto Workers union.   For 
this, however, the UAW alone should not be blamed.  It has been acting in its own interest within 
an institutional setup that was created by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, a 
law that was legislated amid the Great Depression and in understandable sympathy with the 
plight of massively laid-off workers, the victims of then unbridled capitalism.  U.S. unionism 
was thus fostered by Congress as a way of giving workers countervailing power against 
“uncaring” management that considered them mere cogs in the machine.  Unfortunately, 
however, labor and management have ever since been trapped in a relationship that was 
inherently antagonistic and adversarial—that is, a sort of an institutional curse.  True, such 
unionism helped secure unprecedented benefits for tens of thousands of U.S. workers—so long 
as Detroit enjoyed unchallenged competitiveness.  The UAW and automakers both shared the 
spoils of industrial dominance.  
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It was, however, not long before the rest of the industrialized world had caught up, altering the 
competitive environment.  Most importantly, Fordism-cum-Taylorism came to be outcompeted 
by flexible production that was initiated by Toyota.  Toyotism is now being emulated across 
industries worldwide—even the US Postal Service has been endeavoring to adopt flexible 
techniques in its efforts to raise efficiency and to serve customers better.    
 
Auto FDI in the U.S. (known as “transplants”) is centered in non-unionized southern states.  
Foreign multinationals there can produce automobiles cost-effectively largely because of a 
flexible workplace that is unencumbered by restrictive union rules.  Japanese transplants in 
particular thrive on Toyota-style management and production. They are known for their 
workplace “democratization” where the supervisory structure is flattened and where both 
management and workers share common facilities (such as parking lots, cafeterias, and 
restrooms) and common activities (group calisthenics and recreations), all designed to promote 
informal communication and a teamwork spirit.  The pay/compensation gap between executives 
and the rank-and-file is much smaller than that in comparable U.S. companies.  Also, the 
transplants treat workers as “brain” workers who perform multi-tasks on a rotation basis to avoid 
monotonous single task assignments, and actively suggest ways to improve on work practices 
(i.e., kaizen approach).  This is in sharp contrast to the status of workers as “brawn” workers who 
are assigned to simplified repetitive tasks under mass production (as satirized by Charlie 
Chaplin’s Modern Times).  Moreover, they minimize layoffs and furloughs during a downturn, 
retaining and retraining workers.  Also, flexible production relies on “just-in-time” delivery 
(instead of “just-in-case” inventories) of parts and components.  The workers at the transplants 
have so far been turning down the UAW’s offer for unionization. 
 
Some of these practices are emulated by U.S. automakers, but their management culture in 
general and the restrictive work rules in particular are in their way. True, the NUMMI’s labor 
union accepted many of Toyotist techniques, and the factory’s efficiency became far better than 
its GM counterparts.  But it has never attained Toyota’s (or the transplants’) benchmark and 
remained unprofitable—and is set to close despite an ardent plea from Governor Schwarzenegger 
to save it.  Also, from the start, Saturn’s UAW collaborated to eliminate most of its work rules, 
though decried by its traditionalists.  In 2004, however, Saturn’s union voted to dismantle such a 
Toyotist arrangement and went back to the standard UAW contract.  It is headed for closure 
unless a white knight is found.      
      
All in all, the transplants’ competitiveness derives fundamentally from Toyotism, though “no 
legacy costs” certainly help.   Flexible production is not intended to exploit labor but to create a 
larger pie to share with workers.  Wagner Act-enabled collective bargaining disregards the size 
of a pie, even if it shrinks because of workplace inflexibility and disruptive strikes.  Actually, the 
transplants pay higher compensation (about 20% more) than the national average--currently 
employing more than 400,000 Americans at the average annual pay of $63,538.1   At least, 
southern members of congress, governors, and mayors—and workers themselves--understand the 
benefits of flexible production and are eager to attract more auto FDI so as to create well-paid 
manufacturing jobs locally.  This is the reason why even some Democrats in Congress are 
opposed to the EFCA.   
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It is critical for lawmakers—and management, as well as labor—all to realize that the 
antagonistic mode of labor relations institutionalized by the Wagner Act is utterly outdated.  A 
more cooperative relationship is called for.  Simply expanding the power of unions by making 
unionization easier cannot enhance the U.S.’s competitiveness.  Since Detroit is already 
unionized, Detroit South will naturally be the new target of unionization.  Detroit-style 
unionization discourages foreign multinationals from coming to the U.S. and encourages the 
U.S.’s own companies to outsource production overseas.  It is high time for the President and 
Congress to treat unions not merely as an electorate but as a vital economic player who can 
contribute to industrial efficiency and to devise policies for flexible labor.  As part of the Detroit 
bailout conditionality, the UAW agreed to allow for flexibility and cooperation.  This type of 
mandate, at least, ought to be explicitly incorporated into the new bill.     
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